1 research outputs found
Synesthesia: Detecting Screen Content via Remote Acoustic Side Channels
We show that subtle acoustic noises emanating from within computer screens
can be used to detect the content displayed on the screens. This sound can be
picked up by ordinary microphones built into webcams or screens, and is
inadvertently transmitted to other parties, e.g., during a videoconference call
or archived recordings. It can also be recorded by a smartphone or "smart
speaker" placed on a desk next to the screen, or from as far as 10 meters away
using a parabolic microphone.
Empirically demonstrating various attack scenarios, we show how this channel
can be used for real-time detection of on-screen text, or users' input into
on-screen virtual keyboards. We also demonstrate how an attacker can analyze
the audio received during video call (e.g., on Google Hangout) to infer whether
the other side is browsing the web in lieu of watching the video call, and
which web site is displayed on their screen